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ABSTRACT
This article offers the legal profession a method to effectuate on
behalf of authors, designers, or inventors who are residents of Louisiana (or for Louisiana transactions) the rights recognized by federal law on intellectual property (IP) and unfair competition by activating the civil law on incorporeal things. Additionally, it offers a
way to enhance the civil law practitioners’ stock of solutions with
the regular notions of property, contracts, and torts in IP and unfair
competition law for fascinating results. Also, it enables civil law academia to teach IP and unfair competition law through regular
courses such as property, contracts, and torts and cease to label
them as special or sui generis fields of the law.
With the adoption of the legal fiction of the juridical thing, the
legal notions and solutions of the Louisiana Civil Code become
readily available for the practitioner who may handle cases in a
more competitive way. If one removes the words “right of” from the
Louisiana Civil Code article 461 by replacing it with “things consisting,” this subtle but significant change would make the point:
“Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are comprehended
by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes,
obligations, and things consisting of intellectual property.” 1
Very importantly, the juridical thing creates wealth in the individuals and activates private economy for an economic development
that grows bottom up. The individual becomes aware of possessing
a tradeable asset in a cooking recipe, a sales procedure, a builder’s
drawing, or a tailor’s design. It creates wealth like other legal figures did in history; for example, “property” allowed individuals to
own land simultaneously with the king; “mortgage” gave many the
ability to own property where cash flow was lacking; and “wills”
allowed the continuation (and distribution) of property beyond the
life of the property owner. Also, “consensual contracts” permitted
the outburst of massive business transactions in Rome and “security
interests” made possible the overwhelming trade that arose from the
recently discovered Americas.
Last but not least, by intelligently understanding the correlation
between common law and civil law notions relating to IP, we secure
1.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 461 (2019) (alteration added).
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the success of international treaties and prevent misunderstandings
that lead to frustration and conflicts among nations, many of whom
have so often felt unfairly treated.
Keywords: Roman law, civil law, comparative legal history, incorporeal goods, intangible goods, intellectual property, software, license agreements, franchises, good will agreements, trade, secrets
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) law has been highly developed in the
common law in a manner consistent with its substance and procedure. Yet, a comparable development is missing in the civil law,
which has imported almost literally the common law on the matter. 2
The civilian practitioner has consequently come to label it a sui generis 3—one of a kind—area of the law, without a consistent

2. Thomas Nägele, Intellectual Property Protection in Germany and the
EU, 5 WORLD COM. REV. 40 (2011):
German intellectual property law is an aggregate of the Copyright Act
(UrhG), Patent Act (PatG), Trademark Act (MarkenG), Utility Model
Act (GebrMG) and Design Rights Act (GeschMG), flanked by some provisions of the Civil Code (BGB) and the Act Against Unfair Competition
(UWG); and the Federal Act on the Statute and Tasks of the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property (1995).
Further, a review of the intellectual property laws of France (codified in 1992 in
the CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, [C. PROP. INTEL.] [INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CODE]) and Switzerland shows that they are an aggregate of regulations separate from their countries’ civil codes. These codes describe the general
treatment of the matter by the civil law worldwide. The codes of France, Germany
and Switzerland have been the model codes for countries in the world within the
civil law tradition, and the latter have also framed their intellectual property laws
as a collection of regulations separate from the civil code. For a survey on the
laws in the world, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO),
https://perma.cc/4ZNK-L8BN.
3. Moni Wekesa, ATPS, What is Sui Generis System of Intellectual Property Protection? 3, Technopolicy Brief Series No. 13 (African Technology Policy
Studies Network 2006): “In intellectual property rights discourse (IPRs) the term
refers to a special form of protection regime outside the known framework;” see
also John M. Griem Jr., Against a Sui Generis System of Intellectual Property for
Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145, 148 (1993) (describing sui generis
as “a new statutory framework . . . specifically tailored . . . .”).
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understanding of it. 4 Such a mechanism backfires on all, common
law and civil law parties alike, a misunderstanding of the:
4. For example, a common law “License Agreement” is frequently imported to civil law as a “License Contract.” Such translation is a contradiction in
terms because in civil law an act will be either a contract or a license but not both.
See ELOY MADURO-LUYANDO, CURSO DE OBLIGACIONES § 815 (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello 1967); see also “Contrato” and “Licencia,” in GUILLERMO
CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL (Heliasta 1976)
[hereinafter DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL]. A reason for such a translation
is consistent with Schlesinger’ s finding of the legal principle of the “supremacy
of the will” (codified in the 19th century); this principle has made almost every
agreement or promise a transaction enforceable as a contract. RUDOLPH SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 279, 660 (Foundation Press 1988). Furthermore, the common law notion of “property” includes (apart from things) rights
other than the fee simple absolute, which is by and far the main meaning of property in civil law. See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis
of Civil versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2012):
“Common law and civil law property appear to be quite different, with the former
emphasizing pieces of ownership called estates and the latter focusing on holistic
ownership.” See also RENÉ DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS § 312 (Aguilar trans., Dalloz 1973) [hereinafter DAVID, LES GRANDS
SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS]: “The English jurist has a hard time conceiving [the Civil Law’ s] ownership rules and does not understand why we cannot
support a combination [of rights].” Compare the Common Law property rights
(fee simple absolute, fee defeasible, fee tail, life estate) with the following German
provisions:
(2) A contract by which one party agrees to transfer his future property
or a fraction of his future property or to charge it with a usufruct is void
. . . . (4) A contract relating to the estate of a third party who is still living
is void. The same applies to a contract relating to a compulsory portion
or a legacy from the estate of a third party who is still living . . . .
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 311b. See also Thomas
Dreier, How Much ‘Property’ is there in intellectual property? The German Civil
Law Perspective, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
116-117 (Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., Cambridge U. Press 2013)
[hereinafter CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW]. So,
when the term “property” is imported without qualifications from the common
law, the civilian counterpart may wrongly assume it is an absolute right when, in
fact, it may be nothing more than a for-term lease or a revocable license. Finally,
the common law term “patents” introduced as property, turns out to be misleading
in civil law, because for the civil law a patent is a title to a right (Título, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL, supra) and transactions including rights over
rights are not permissible. While this may not be a hurdle for the common law
attorney, the civilian attorney is compelled to ascertain the patent subject matter
(an invention, a process or a model) and not the “patent” in a transaction. See
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (Fr.), art. 516; BGB (Ger.), art. 90. The Bello
Code is an exception to the general rule prohibiting rights over rights but only in
a limited way (CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (Chile), art. 565). René
David explains that:
To translate ‘legal rule’ to norme juridique is not exactly appropriate; it
is a wrong translation of the true nature of the [Common Law] ‘legal
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. . . subtlety and complexity of the differences between the
two legal traditions . . . . can affect all forms and phases of
international dealings . . . . They get in the way of international negotiations . . . . They cripple foreign aid programs
[,] . . . . limit the effectiveness of cultural exchange . . . . [,]
misdirect effort and misallocate resources. 5
II. THE ROMAN LAW LEGACY
Roman law serves as the basis for articulating common law and civil
law, and also as a means to articulate both IP and unfair competition law
within each of these legal traditions.6 However, two caveats are pertinent. Civil law is not Roman law, and Roman law is not the expression
of the political organization of the Roman Empire. A first impression
may lead the reader to equate civil law with Roman law. The reason lies
in that civil law has indeed adopted Roman legal principles and solutions
and made them its own. Nevertheless, it has not adopted the Roman rules
entirely or unqualifiedly7 and its method for finding and applying the
law is foreign to the Roman legal practice (which English common law

rule.’ From the [Common Law] perspective, the French legal rule is rather in the rank of a legal principle; it considers the French legal rule
more as a moral precept than a true legal rule. The [Common Law] legal
rule for us instead looks more like a specific application by the judge of
a legal rule.
DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra, at § 321. See
also Alvaro D’Ors: “The English, since the end of the Middle Ages, call legislation ‘statutes,’ while Europeans call local law ‘statuta.’” ALVARO D’ORS, ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO PRIVADO ROMANO § 4 (EUNSA 1991); the list of examples
may go on and on.
5. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 151 (3d ed., Stanford U. Press 2007).
6. See PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN
CIVIL LAW (Hambledon Press 1988); see also MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN
AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (U. of Georgia Press 1997); D’Ors, supra note 4;
ANDRÉS BELLO, DERECHO ROMANO (La Casa de Bello 1959); FRITZ SCHULZ,
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW (Clarendon Press 1951).
7. “[N]o Civil Law country has ever received the entire body of the Roman
Law. Modern codes have discarded obsolete doctrines, rules, and institutions and
have introduced new rules based on indigenous ideas.” JACK DAVIES & ROBERT
P. LAWRY, INSTITUTIONS AND METHODS OF THE LAW 172 (West 1982) (quoting
ATHANASSIOS NICHOLAS YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 38
(Claitor’ s 1971)).
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resembles instead). 8 The method of civil law finds the law in legal
principles, which are applied in a mathematical way to the case, 9
while Roman law finds the law after the analogical analysis of the
cases and offers it to the decision-maker (or praetor) as opinions. 10
On the other hand, Roman law is not the expression of the political organization of the Empire. 11 Roman law was instead the outcome of a private professional development carried out during a
continuous period of some 300 years (150 BC–150 AD) sharing in
both the republican and imperial periods of Rome by people like the
Scaevola generations (133 BC–95 BC), Labeo (30 BC), Papinianus,
Paulus, and Julian (100 AD) among many others. 12 It was a quiet and
relatively far reduced number of people in contact with the praetors and
authorities reflecting a superior spirit and invisible authority.13
The development of Roman law was a unique event in history, and it
was followed by the work of the glossators in the 11th and 12th centuries
of our era, the commentators in the 14th century and much later the national codification movement of the 19th century.14
Here is what Roman law suggests to the civil law today on this point:
Idea est ens per se!, meaning that “the idea is a self-existing thing”—a
thing. The reason to claim ideas as things (i.e., self-existing things)

8. See DAVIES & LAWRY, supra note 7 (quoting Athanassios Nicholas
Yiannopoulos):
In contrast to modern civil law, common law is basically case law, as
Roman Law was; the development of equity jurisdiction in England had
a counterpart in Rome; and both common law and Roman Law are characterized by adherence to tradition, strong individualism, the practical
approach, and by the absence of a separate body of commercial law.
See also “England has a peculiar legal tradition which is distinct from the Romanistic of Europe, although [England] turns out to be more faithful to the procedures
of the Roman jurists.” D’ORS, supra note 4, at § 4.
9. See STEIN, supra note 6, at 37.
10. Id. at 37-41; JAMES HADLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW IN TWELVE
ACADEMICAL LECTURES 77 et seq. (Forgoten Books Publ’ g 2012).
11. HADLEY, supra note 10, at 51 et seq.
12. See D’ORS, supra note 4, at 58.
13. See LUIS LEGAZ Y LACAMBRA, FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO 439 (Bosch
1979); D’ORS, supra note 4, at 99.
14
Ricardo Bethencourt, Knowing Justice for Sure, in fine, https://perma.cc
/9ZKN-MFNV.
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lies in the mechanics of Roman law, which rests on the notion of
things. 15 Roman law and its textbooks make this evident. 16
In contrast, the mechanics of the common law rest upon the duties or
actions of individuals rather than on things,17 as does the civil law, although to a different extent.18 It is from there that terms arise in common
15. “The law, strictly conceived [and as compared to public law or moral,
political, economic, sociological or other perspectives of the law], seeks an order
in property,” that is, “among people towards benefiting from the possession and
use of things.” ALVARO D’ORS, UNA INTRODUCCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO §
39 (Rialp 1989) (alteration added). “The role of [the law] is to ‘point out’ the share
of each individual: this ‘thing’ or such debt that belongs to x.” MICHEL VILLEY, 1
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT—DÉFINITIONS ET FINS DU DROIT § 54 (Dalloz 1975). See
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Q. 58, art. 10; see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk V. Were the subject matter of the roman law to
involve matters other than things, such as social order and rulings of the Prince
which are subject to change at will or by factors foreign to justice, the roman law
could hardly had achieved its model role, one which has made law quantifiable
and certain, a technique and a profession, as commonly recognized. See Andrés
Bello, Inauguration Speech of the University of Chile (Sept. 17, 1843):
Roman Law has no equal: some of its principles may be objected; but its
method, logic and scientific system have made and preserved it superior
to all other legal traditions; its texts are the masterpiece of legal style; its
method is the geometry applied in all its rigor to moral thought. So, says
L’ Herminier.
16. THEODOR MOMMSEN & PAUL KRUEGER, CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS (Lawbook Exchange 2010); D’ORS, supra note 4; SCHULZ, supra note 6; BELLO, supra
note 6; SAMUEL PARSONS SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW (Lawbook Exchange 2013).
17. “[The Common Law’s] immediate concern is to reinstate peace . . . it
appears as essentially a Public Law . . . arisen from procedure,” DAVID, LES
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra note 4, at § 14; See also id.
§§ 274, 276, 295-6, 315. See VILLEY, supra note 15, at §§ 42, 54 in fine (alterations added):
[M]ost of our contemporaries [Civil Law and Common Law] confuse
law and morality. You have been often explained that the law is a set of
rules of conduct. The ‘legal proposition’ would be responsible for stating
what acts are permitted or prohibited; to which we are ‘forced.’ The ancient science [Greek-Roman] of the relationships of the law is overshadowed by the [modern] science of behavior, which seems to come from
Morals . . . . But . . . the role of a judgment or an article of our civil code
is to ‘point out’ the share of each individual: this ‘thing’ or such debt that
belongs to x. The law is to aim first to this ‘object,’ a relationship between citizens; and the primary function of a lawyer is to ‘measure’ its
consistency.
18. See DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra
note 4, at §§ 13, 321:
[In the Civil Law tradition] the rules are conceived as rules of conduct
closely linked to concerns of justice and morals . . . . The rule of law [in
the Civil Law], closely connected to moral theology . . . is a rule susceptible to orient the conduct of the citizens in most cases . . . .
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law, with French origins, like “license” (from the Latin, “to authorize”),
“lease” (from the Latin, “to let go”), “easements” (from the old French,
“to ease”), and “sale.” The Roman law instead will use terms like
“loan” or commodatum (instead of license), “rent” or locatio conductio (instead of lease), servitutes (instead of easements), and emptio venditio (instead of sale). All these Roman terms relate directly
to the disposition of the thing involved in the transaction. 19
III. THE “IDEA” HERE IS NOT THE IDEA OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 20 Judge Learned Hand
delivered an opinion, where two plays—the first for the stage and
the second for the big-screen—had in common the idea of a mixed
religious marriage between members of an Irish family and a Jewish
family. The plaintiff sued that the film had copied the idea of the
play.
As the idea in the film was expressed very differently than in the
play, Judge Hand replied that although the parties shared the same
idea—the idea of a mixed religious marriage—its “expression” by
each party was very different and therefore was not an infringing
copy. Consequently, Judge Hand distinguished the “idea” from its
“expression” and determined that only a copy of the expression—
not of the idea—would constitute a violation of property (i.e., copyright). This distinction is now a classic principle of law.
Because we propose here the use of the term “idea” as a thing
that may be owned, running against a copyright axiom that says that

See also VILLEY, supra note 15, at §§ 42, 54.
19. Rent involved locare, that is, “the very act of ‘placing—locare—’ the thing
. . . in the Roman conception ‘rent’ was precisely this act of ‘locare.’” As for “the
‘emptio venditio’ [sale] . . . the ‘emptor’ . . . takes for itself—emit—the thing
purchased.” D’Ors, supra note 4, at § 499. Further, “‘iura praediorum or servitutes’ are the names for certain realty rights which the owners of neighboring lots
set voluntarily so that one lot—called servant lot—would ‘serve’ another lot—
called dominant lot—.” D’Ors, supra note 15, at § 190. For more such terms, see
N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. REV.
1265 (1994).
20. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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ideas are not things, it is necessary to qualify the term “idea” in this
article. For Judge Hand, an idea is “too generalized an abstraction” 21
within copyright law, whereas “idea” as we mean it includes the
very intellectual operation, such as sense perceptions, analogies, distinctions, and conclusions. These operations also include patents,
trademarks, trade secrets, and every other intellectual property. The
word “idea” in civil law would then become a term of art. 22
It is necessary to have a particular word available for every form
of intellectual property, so that IP rules may be consistent and applicable to all such forms. It will also allow the existing rules on property, torts, and contracts (sale, lease, agency, partnership, etc.) and
guarantees (bonds, pledge, and mortgage) to apply to every IP and
not just exceptionally to some of them (in which event, a general
theory would become ineffectual).
A. Nature of Intellectual Property
A reason for the lack of a consistent development of IP rules in
the civil law may be found in the existential nature of the intangible
property. For instance, under the intellectual framework of the civil
law, the notion of technology does exist, but technology does not
exist in and of itself. This principle can be analogized to color. The
color “green” is not suspended by itself in a “mine of green,” and
the color “blue” is not there by itself in a “quarry of blue.” The green
color is always found in something else: the green in a plant or the
green in a chemical solution; the blue in the sky or in the ocean. 23
21. Id.
22. If at all, “idea” here shares more with the copyright term “original works
of authorship.” We could use the term “work,” but we prefer “idea” because this
word directly evokes an intellectual activity, while “work” can also refer to material realities.
23. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS I.8, V.7, XI.8, XIV, 1; ARISTOTLE, THE CATEGORIES passim; ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS A 3: 186 a 28-31. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
DE PRINCIPIIS NATURAE 1: 39 b 32-33 and 1: 39 a 1-4; see AQUINAS, supra note
15, at I, Q. 3, art. 6; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES lib. 1 cap.
23 and lib. 2 cap. 52; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA, cap. 5; see
AQUINAS, supra note 15, at I, Q. 28. art. 1 and I, Q. 50, art. 1 et seq.; ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, DE SPIRITUALIBUS CREATURIS a. 1. JOSEPH DE TORRE, CHRISTIAN
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In descriptive manuals, or in devices built with the help of a
manual, technology does exist (like “green” in a chemical solution)
and that is why protective measures are taken for the use of such
things. However, little does it take for the practitioner to find himself
lost again in his or her efforts to segregate and individualize technology in manuals or devices. As soon as a technology is found present in the device by which it is built or in the manual that describes
it, it will also be simultaneously existing in as many devices or manuals as there may be later produced. How then could legal interests
be controlled when so many samples are handed over from one party
to another, or to a third party who is a total stranger to the inventor,
or to even a multitude of users?
Likewise, technology is also intangibly present in individual
people (like the color blue in a piece of cloth), such as when the
individual learns it or invents it. In this case, the legal practitioner is
also confronted by a similar situation. If I “individualize” the presence of a technology in Mr. Doe, who invented it, how then will I
individualize it when Mr. Doe discloses it to Mr. Joe and Mr. Joe
further discloses it to Mr. Roe? Technology is now present not in
one individual or two, but in three. And, if the technology is filed
with the Patent and Trademark Office and is available to the public
at large, then such technology is no longer present in a restricted
PHILOSOPHY 82 (Palabra 1985). TOMÁS ALVIRA, LUIS CLAVELL, & TOMAS MELENDO, METAFÍSICA 53 et seq. (EUNSA 1982). ANTONIO MILLÁN PUELLES, LÉXICO FILOSÓFICO 7 (Rialp 2002). Gaven Kerr, Aquinas: Metaphysics § 4, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://perma.cc/KWS7-CSBS. See also
ETIENNE GILSON, BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS (PIMS 1952); Kathrin
Koslicki, Substance, Independence and Unity, in ARISTOTLE ON METHOD AND
METAPHYSICS (Edward Feser ed., Palgrave MacMillam 2013); JOHN F. WIPPEL,
THE METAPHYSICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS—FROM FINITE BEING TO
UNCREATED BEING 198 et seq. (CUA Press 2000). Thomas Rego, Materia, forma
y privación en el opúsculo de “Principiis naturae” de Santo Tomás de Aquino,
64 SAPIENTIA (2008), https://perma.cc/DLJ5-7YUN. For recent perspectives on
the Aristotelian doctrine of accident, see PAUL SLOMKOWSKI, ARISTOTLE’ S TOPICS 90–93 (BRILL 1997). On work opposing the substance-accident distinction,
see Willard Van Orman Quine, On What There Is, REV. METAPHYSICS (1948)
(allowing for the proposition that all reality is accidental); see also Saul A. Kripke,
A Puzzle about Belief, in MEANING AND USE (Avishai Margalit ed., Reidel 1979)
(allowing for the proposition that no reality is accidental).
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circle of people (so as to arguably resort to a joint tenancy), but it is
available to the public at large, a fact that alone excludes individual
property. 24
If technology is present “in” material things, and “in” individuals, and simultaneously in all of them at once, it is not possible to
individualize it theoretically in one singular thing or person alone,
and thus appropriate it. Nevertheless, because the law demands that
technology be separately individualized to be appropriated, we find
ourselves confronted by contradicting terms. First, there is a technology that cannot exist by itself and typically not in one thing alone.
Second, there is a requirement for justice that demands that technology does exist in such a way and that it belongs to someone. How,
then, can this contradiction be reconciled, if ever? And because
every other kind of intellectual property, such as copyright and
trademark, consists of idea—as defined herein—they share in the
same existential nature and same question.
B. The Fictional Existence of Ideas: The Juridical Thing
Under the given premises, if we face a contradiction here, it is
also true that these situations, rather than being unusual, are all the
more frequent in the law. The legal solution that may be given to
24. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association 1905), https://perma.cc/PR8F-MHKL:
By a universal law, indeed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs
to all men equally and in common, is the property for the moment of him
who occupies it, but when he relinquishes the occupation, the property
goes with it. Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late
in the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in
exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess
as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces
itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less,
because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea
from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
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such contradiction consists of ignoring the natural reality—what
is—and stressing instead the legal reality—what for. This then warrants a fiction: that objects having no existence of their own be
treated as having one. Based on this fiction, we are able to say that
technology will exist legally as if it had an independent existence;
i.e., as if the color blue would stand alone in a department store or
the color green in a mine of green, even if this is physically impossible. We may now also come to speak of juridical things just as we
speak of certain legal entities as “juridical persons,” which are entities also created by way of legal fiction.
Intangible property encompasses more than the sole legal rights
prescribed in the codes. In this day and age, it also includes companies’ goodwill, business relationships, public figures’ celebrity,
works of authorship, aesthetic works, architectural drawings, trademarks, technology, technical information, processes, and generally
any idea with legal value.
The difficulty we find in treating intangible property as things
comes not from the fact that they do not exist but, again, from the
fact that they do not exist in and unto themselves. There can be no
“goodwill” without a business owner, “business relationship” without contractors, “fame” without a character, “idea” without an inventor, author, or artist. The difficulty we find in taking these intangible things as self-existing things is due simply to the fact that it is
not (physically) possible.
We submit that for the law it is a general assumption that a thing
must be a self-existing thing. This conclusion is elicited directly
from the foundational notions of the law. 25 Further, modern scholars
explain that, from a legal perspective, things must be (i) individual,
(ii) valuable, (iii) divisible, and (iv) licit. 26 Scholars also have
25. ARISTOTLE, supra note 15; AQUINAS, supra note 15, at I, Q. 28. art. X;
MOMMSEN & KRUEGER, supra note 16; See VILLEY, supra note 15, at § 54;
SCHULZ, supra note 6; D’ORS, supra note 15, at § 190; BELLO, supra note 6. See
also discussion throughout notes 14-18 herein.
26. GERT KUMMEROW, BIENES Y DERECHOS REALES 34 (Universidad Central de Venezuela 1969) (quoting Biondo Biondi); MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ
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emphasized that among the Roman classic jurists, things are entities
composed of matter, i.e., tangible things; 27 this is because matter
meets those conditions and are certainly self-existing.
However, currently, not only tangible things are valuable, also intangible things are.28 Precisely because ideas have a surpassing value in
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (F. Pichon 1904); ALAIN BÉNABENT & DENIS
MAZEAUD, LES GRANDS ARTICLES DU CODE CIVIL Tit. I (Dalloz 2014); HENRI
MAZEAUD, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL (Montchrestien 1976); AMBROISE COLIN &
HENRI CAPITANT, 4 COURS ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS (Librairie
Dalloz 1942); LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANÇAIS (Sirey
1939); JEAN DOMAT, 1 THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER Tit. III (Little &
Brown 1850); ROBERTO DE RUGGIERO, CARLO MAIORCA, & FULVIO MAROI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE (Giuseppe Principato 1961); FRANCESCO MESSINEO,
MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE (Giuffré 1965); ALBERTO LA
ROCHE, II DERECHO CIVIL 26 (Impresora Nacional 1981); 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PROPERTY AND TRUST Part 5 (Athanassios

Nicholas Yiannopoulos ed., JCB Mohr Publisher 1994).
27. Angel Cristóbal Montes, La “Res Extra Commercium” en el Derecho
Romano, 32 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD CENTRAL DE VENEZUELA (1965). Montes denies further that the term thing in roman
classic law could have included legal interests or intangible entities even though
the justinian codification did so later. Contra Luis René Viso, Las cosas y los
derechos reales en el Derecho Romano y en nuestra legislación, 40 REVISTA DE
LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO, LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ZULIA (1974). Yiannopoulos
says that “in deference to the terminology of the Code, the word ‘things’ will
apply narrowly to physical objects and rights having a pecuniary value, susceptible of appropriation, and broadly to physical objects in space regardless of their
pecuniary value and their susceptibility of appropriation.” Athanassios Nicholas
Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 759 (1962), available at https://perma.cc/P5YN-UWVU. See
also Pottage and Sherman describing that the term “res” or thing in roman law
did not intend to require materiality or exclude intangibility but the “matter of
concern” to the jurist. Alain Pottage & Brad Sherman, On the Prehistory of Intellectual Property, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
supra note 4, at 14.
27. A myriad of statements has been made to this effect. Let us quote two made
more than 20 years ago. See ST. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS § 32 (emphasis in original):
Whereas at one time the decisive factor of production was the land, and
later capital—understood as a total complex of the instruments of production—today the decisive factor is increasingly man himself, that is,
his knowledge, especially his scientific knowledge, his capacity for interrelated and compact organization, as well as his ability to perceive the
needs of others and to satisfy them.
See also Philip J. Carroll, CEO of Shell Oil Corp., Address at the Conference on
Owners and Contractors—improving Process and Performance (Nov. 15, 1994):
For two centuries after the Industrial Revolution, the success corresponded to those who owned or controlled natural resources or knew
how to use them better. But in recent decades, we’ve been part of an
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today’s economy, the emergence of them as substantive things—or just
plainly as things—in the law is inevitable. The legal fiction we submit
here solves the problem that its contingent existence poses to the
law. Further, by distinguishing strict property interests from “moral”
interests, the hurdles resulting from the legal commingling of the
two may be overcome by the use of this legal fiction. 29 Evidently,
this fiction seems plain and simple—in fact, it is.
That the thing has to be self-existing and not contingent (for the
law) is what is not explicitly said in the textbooks. This may certainly
have been because there was no practical need, but now the need is
compelling. The individual person is now an economic component
of wealth. In addition, because a human being must not be the property of another, an abstraction is mandated: to segregate intellectually from the individual what is inherently his or hers and is relevant
economically: an idea.
This segregation (and materialization) is made plain in everyday
transactions. Why not do the same in the law? It is possible, provided that the thing be a self-existing thing; and so, as a solution, we
submit the fiction of the juridical thing.

admirable transition to a knowledge economy . . . . We will have to move
beyond corporate hierarchical structures, strongly centralized and supervisory that worked so well in the past. We will have to reinvent our organizations so that we can ensure our success in the future. We must
move the decisions to be located close to where the action takes place;
this is where it belongs. We must encourage people to develop a sense
of membership for its part of the work and our companies as a whole.
We must give them the tools, especially information, to succeed in the
new economy in which they are our main resource.
29. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27 (2), Dec.
10, 1948: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author.” On the discussion of property vs. moral rights, see MICHELE BOLDRIN
& DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (Cambridge U. Press
2008); Mike Masnick, If Intellectual Property Is Neither Intellectual, Nor Property, What Is It? TECHDIRT (Mar. 6, 2008), https://perma.cc/4VSC-2YEQ; Richard A. Spinello, Intellectual Property Rights, 25 LIBR. HI-TECH. 12 (2007);
Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1
(2001); and Beatriz Busaniche, ¿Por qué no hablamos de propiedad intelectual?,
in Monopolios artificiales sobre bienes intangibles, Vialibre (2007), at
https://perma.cc/MB3M-YCUQ.
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C. Reason for Fictions
The juridical thing satisfies the intellectual effort to make ideas
a legal asset while respecting their existential nature, without forcing
a reduction of them to material objects. 30 Yet, are legal fictions a
simplistic and artificial resort to an otherwise insoluble issue? Are
fictions a fictitious easy way out, which would not stand serious legal professional practice? We answer in the negative: legal fictions
are and have always been a true legal resource. 31
30. In an effort to claim legal protection for ideas as granted to material
things, Prof. Carosone, for example, sought to materialize the idea in an electrochemical reaction. See Oscar Carosone, L’opera dell’ingegno, quale bene
immateriale: una teoria controversa, 143 RIVISTA DI GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA
387 et seq. (1991). Moreover, in an effort to overcome peripheral, exceptional and
analogous forms of intellectual property and secure it the same legal standing than
property in material things, Pottage and Sherman explain that the historical justification of property rights in material things are all the more evident with intellectual property today. See Pottage & Sherman, supra note 27, at 28, in fine.
31. JOSÉ PUIG BRUTAU, LA JURISPRUDENCIA COMO FUENTE DEL DERECHO
159 et seq. (Bosch 1952):
J. W. Jones points out that for people generally the legal fiction is generally the characteristic feature of the mental process most akin to the
legal profession. This forms the basis for much of the criticisms to the
legal profession. But, resorting to fictions is in fact part of legal mechanics. Put in another way, the law may use fictions as a means but not as
an end. Such a condition operates similarly with language where its sense
or power of conveying meaning stems out from the use of fictions; especially with the metaphor. The law is like a metaphor at the service of
justice. Law, as an order of rules, is not alien to reality, even though it
may not be readily translatable to a reality apprehensible by the senses.
Law does not affirm anything that relates to a given reality; it limits itself
to establish the legal consequences that must adhere to a series of facts
that are, indeed, existing. Fictions are of means and not of ends; that is,
fictions never consist of results but rather in crediting results to facts
which did not have such results credited to them in the first place; in this
way, securing justice to the case. As Julius Stone puts it, it is not that
restitution proceeds because there is a contract but rather that a contract
is assumed because a restitution is appropriate.
A valuable survey of legal fictions going back to roman law is found in PIERRE
J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE (Rotterdam U.
Press 1975). Also useful, is Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions
and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 1 (1990). The classic
defense of legal fictions remains with LON LUVOIS FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS
(Stanford U. Press 1967). Earlier efforts to justify legal fictions include WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 43 (Clarendon Press
1768); RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husic trans.,
Boston Book Co. 1914); RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS
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Evidence that fictions are a valid resource for the law, includes the great number of fictions that exist in it. No one thinks
of them as simplistic or tampered solutions. For example, the
law has developed many fictions, like that of legal entities or
quasi contracts. The latter establishes certain liabilities as if they
had arisen from a contract where there is nothing more than a
factual situation. Additional fictions consist of “constructive
trust,” “adoption,” and the very assimilation in the civil law of
certain things to legally become movable and/or immovable assets. 32
There are several rules that are born out of legal fictions. In
fact, legal rules are not born solely out of common sense, plain
evidence, or habits, but require ingenuity as well as thoughtful
and creative intellectual activity. In developing intellectual
property, fictions constitute a valid resource. René David expresses that “[i]t has taken centuries of doctrinal effort to reach
the formulas, which now seem so simple and obvious in our Civil
Code.” 33
Louisiana Civil Code article 3440 on the protection of precarious possession can serve as an example. It reads: “Where there is a
disturbance of possession, the possessory action is available to a precarious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, against anyone
except the person for whom he possesses.” This provision was
AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUDEN DER ENTWICKLUNG (7th ed., Breitkopf & Hartel 1923); and PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAW (Martha McC. Read trans., Macmillan 1922). For more on justifying legal
fictions, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 41-45, 338-350 (Brentano 1930); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 25-26 (John
Murray 1861); and Alf Ross, Legal Fictions, in LAW, REASON AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 217-231 (Graham Hughes ed., NYU Press 1969).
32. E.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 470, 473, 475 (2019); CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] art. 259 (Puerto Rico). See Legal Fiction, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY

(9th ed. 2009). For a review of fictions on modern history, see Maksymilian Del
Mar, Introducing Fictions: Examples, Functions, Definitions and Evaluations, in
LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Del Mar & Twining eds., Springer
2015).
33. DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra note 4,
at § 70, in fine.
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introduced by the 1982 revision of occupancy and possession.
Though comment (a) says that it is new, 34 this provision has a correlation with the situation in which the praetor Quintus Publicius
was engaged in 67 BC. Appearing before him was a citizen without
the legally required two-year possession of a property, who had been
evicted by a person who had possessed the property for a shorter
time. The former had no title nor action against the latter, but clearly,
the latter had less of a right. Should the latter party still prevail?
The Roman praetor had no legal recourse to allow the aggrieved
citizen to claim relief. Since he was not a dominus, he needed to
show that he had at least one other right over the property from
which he had been evicted. Alternatively, he needed to demonstrate
that he had a minimum of two years possession, which he did not
have. Therefore, the praetor, not having any legal recourse available, contrived a solution by granting this citizen:
an action . . . the formula of which instructed the judge to
pretend that the legal time required for the usucapio or adverse possession [2 years] had elapsed . . . . Thus, the praetor
managed to allow an action for whomsoever had received
possession in good faith, but had lost it to a dispossessing
party before the completion of the legal time for usucapio or
adverse possession was achieved. The grieved citizen could
avail himself of an action just as if he were a legitimate
owner. 35
Justice was done.
So, when is legal fiction fake? First, when it is unnecessary,
but also when it is disproportionate to the case. 36 An example of
an inadequate fiction is precisely the one in connection with the
legal treatment of computer software. Is it necessary in civil law
to equate computers to people or legal entities—here lies the
34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3440 cmt. a (2019).
35. D’ORS, supra note 4, at § 176.
36. On questioning the admission of new legal fictions, see Peter J. Smith,
New Legal Fictions, 95 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1435-1495 (2007). On vindicating legal fictions from pejorative claims, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Fictions Revisited (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 29, 2011). On an
evaluation of fictions on modern history, see Del Mar, supra note 32.
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fiction—to treat computer programs under le droit d’auteur (copyright)?
IV. THE NOTION OF USE
Now, how are ideas used? We can wear, ride, or consume tangibles. Yet, intangibles do not allow for this kind of use. Should the
use or ius utendi of intangibles be denied? Should intellectual property be limited to the right to dispose of and receive profits from it,
i.e., the classic ius abutendi and ius fruendi, excluding the ius
utendi? 37 Certainly not. The nature of the property rights relating to
intangibles we submit here is not one consisting of an exception—a
sui generis property right—but an ordinary kind, one that includes
all three iusus. The notion of use is not only about the physical occupation of a thing or any similar act involving a physical possession. 38 The ius utendi, or right-to-use, has been identified traditionally with the physical use of things. Yet, we believe that this reflects
only the nature of the goods on which those uses have been exercised for centuries—i.e., tangible goods—not the nature of the ius
utendi or right-to-use.

37. HENRI Y LEON MAZEAUD & JEAN MAZEAUD, DERECHO CIVIL IV—La
evolución del derecho de propiedad y la propiedad de los bienes incorporales, 2229 (Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América 1960). From another angle, Josserand
sees three different characteristics in the right of property, namely: 1) the direct
relationship between the legal interest and the property; 2) the full use of the property; and 3) the exclusive or universal enforceability under the law. These three
characteristics are also to be found in the ownership of intellectual property: the
first because the right rests on the idea and not on a right to the idea (thereby
producing an arguably uncertain property right), the second feature is realized for
the aforesaid, and the third feature is fulfilled by way of public recordings. LOUIS
JOSSERAND, CONFIGURATION DU DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ DANS L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE
NOUVEAU 95 et seq. (Mélanges juridiques dédiés à M. le professeur Sugiyama
1940). See also KUMMEROW, supra note 26, at 229-230. See Propiedad, CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL, supra note 4, at § 2.
38. “‘Use’ is the application or employment of something.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed., West 2004) [hereinafter BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 2004];
see THOMAS PATRICK BURKE, THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE: IS SOCIAL JUSTICE JUST?
173 (Continuum 2011); see also PETER LINDSAY, CREATIVE INDIVIDUALISM: THE
DEMOCRATIC VISION OF C. B. MACPHERSON 142 (SUNY Press 1996).
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In the past, the law has confronted historical changes such as these.
When in the ancient world immovable things became assets subject to
property, Romans developed the notions of ius abutendi, ius fruendi,
and ius utendi. 39 Also, when over 500 years ago, the exercise of the ius
abutendi in a market economy could not be served with the ritual forms
of earlier centuries, negotiable instruments and bankruptcy were introduced. 40 Thus, the word use, in itself, does not mean or implicate things
or actions of a necessary tangible nature (such as possession, occupation, or seizure), and even tangible use involves different types of content because use relates mainly with actions we perform:
[The] tangible use has legal consequences; and so the use of
a jewel is to put it on and wear it, though one may lose it or
expose it to theft; the use of a garment is to wear it and eventually take it off; while the use of edibles, is to obviously eat
them, which means their extinction. Hence, (also) the classifications of goods in consumable and non-consumable; and
the existence of different rules for the usufruct of consumable or perishable things . . . . 41
Use is a word denoting work, exercise, practice, or action. In
other words, use indicates demeanor. 42 In case law, the word use
(with the same Latin root usus) includes “to execute or
39. FRITZ SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE (Clarendon Press
1946). PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (Cambridge U. Press
1999). D’Ors, supra note 4. BELLO, supra note 6.
40. Bill of Exchange, 3 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Hugh Chisholm ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 1911). CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 30 (Princeton U.
Press 2009). Layton B. Register, The Dual System of Civil Law and Commercial
Law, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 240, 245 (1913). Rafael Ernesto Bedoya Rivas, El Derecho Mercantil y la Búsqueda Moderna de sus Orígenes 8-9 (U. de la Sabana
2009). See Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant
Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265-304 (2003).
41. Uso, CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL
(Heliasta 1976), meaning “f.”
42. Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed., West 2004). See also Use,
BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (BARRON’S EDUC. SERIES 1984); Uso, CABANELLAS
DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL (Heliasta, 1976). References
to the very legal definition of the word “use” adopted by scholars—such as “use
things for your convenience or to fulfill your needs,” or use as the “action or effect
of using a thing,”—clearly reveal that “use” also denotes a human behavior, an
action.
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accomplish” a goal. 43 Not surprisingly, the term “customary
law” was coined after the word use, as customary law is the law
established after people’s customs, conducts, and actions. 44
A further illustration of the meaning of the word use as human behavior can to be found in the Latin term ius abutendi,
which translates literally into “right-to-abuse,” which, in turn, is
derived from the terms ab and usus. Such “abuse” is to be understood as the act of disposal and not as an excessive behavior.
Prefixed with ab (meaning “away from” in Latin), abuse means
alienation or separation of a thing from one’s usus or actions. 45
Also, the word use has generated multiple meanings—presumably because it refers to a reality as basic as human actions—one of which is “time.” Thus, the term “make use of” (or
“have no use of”) is defined by the Webster’s College Dictionary as “to have occasion to use.” 46 Also, the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary refers to use as “a period of time
something is being used or can be used.” 47
V. USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In this context, it seems plain to us that while ideas do not allow
for a physical use, they allow for intangible use. What is this use
like? Also, what type of acts do we exert over this property? The
law describes this use with terms like “making, using, selling, offering for sale, . . . [and] importing”; 48 also, reproducing, deriving, distributing, performing, displaying, transmitting, 49 and “identifying
43. Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed., West 1991), meaning “v.”
44. Customary Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 2004, supra note 38.
45. Id. at Abusus and Abuse. See also Abuse, WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Wiley 2004) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY].
46. Id. at Use.
47. See CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY (Cambridge U.
Press 2015), https://perma.cc/35JH-JJ2Z.
48. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 a (2019). WIPO, Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use 17 (Switzerland 2008) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Handbook], https://perma.cc/5QMH-8RAD.
49. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). Intellectual Property Handbook,
supra note 48, at §§ 2.178 et seq.
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and distinguishing.” 50 All of these terms disclose the one common
feature of reproduction. 51 This is so because reproduction is the one
act that transfers the possession of ideas; possession being a pivotal
aspect of property law.
Consequently, we succinctly define the wide range of uses described in three essential types of reproduction gathered by the case
law 52: exhibiting, copying, or applying; 53 like in: (i) exhibiting a
sculpture or a painting, or presenting a play; (ii) copying a script, a
movie, a musical, literary work, a scientific report, a trademark, etc.;
and (iii) applying a formula, a design, a computer software.
The specific use of ideas determines their kind. For example, the
use of applied ideas is realized by their application in nature. This
includes formulas, procedures, models, and the subject matter of patent law. Computer programs are interesting: their use is their application; yet such application is exercised in the form of copying,
which is the use proper to speculative ideas. They still qualify as an
applied idea. However, because their copying does not pursue an
intellectual appreciation, but a useful application within a computer.
Regarding speculative ideas, their use is realized not in their useful application, but in their intellectual appreciation. Here, the acts
legally relevant consist of copying that allow or restrict their intellectual appreciation. Speculative ideas include the works of authorship and the subject matter of copyright law (excluding computer
software).
We are left with a third category: incorporated speculative ideas,
the usefulness of which is also realized in their appreciation (rather

50. Cf. Intellectual Property Handbook, supra note 48, at §§ 2.318 et seq.;
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO), https://perma.cc/A83M-2DVU.
51. See Copyright Act, supra note 49.
52. See Intellectual Property (IP) Policy, USPTO, https://perma.cc/F9Z3KQYB. See also Intellectual Property Handbook, supra note 48.
53. Yet, and due to the fiction of the juridical thing, it is also possible that
intangible assets be “occupied” or “possessed.” To this end, consider how the
rules on deposit and sequestration in the Louisiana Civil Code are applicable to
intellectual property once the juridical thing is suitably included.
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than in their application), but they require a material support; examples of this are sculptures and paintings.
The objects produced by 3D copying are not incorporated speculative ideas but are the matter of possession and/or tangible property rights. The intellectual property rights that arise from 3D copying are vested instead in the computer programs and/or designs (i.e.,
applied ideas), which produce the 3D objects. Making the distinction between the idea and the object containing the incorporated
speculative ideas is irrelevant because these ideas exist only in these
objects. These ideas cannot be reproduced in other objects and the
reproduction rights will consist of the ability to exhibit them. They
cannot be reproduced even by the author himself who will, at best,
produce a new work of art, or an imitation, or a development thereof.
There is also the intangible use of the business goodwill, as we
find it in franchise agreements; and the use of a character’s name or
appearance. These assets are non-intellectual incorporeal property.
Other uses of ideas include the very ability of perceiving or understanding them, and their logical and experimental verification. However, because these operations are personal to the individual, having
no exposure towards third parties (unless otherwise exhibited, copied, or applied), such uses become legally irrelevant despite the relevance these uses may have in fields like psychology or ethics.
Finally, intangible use involves overcoming the natural tendency and centuries-long practice of identifying property rights with
tangible things and coming instead to perceive property rights only
in themselves—a rational abstraction—regardless of the thing to
which it refers. Only then can intellectual property be fully understood in the civil law.
VI. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE JURIDICAL THING
A. As with Legal Entities
It should be noted now that there exists a construct available to
a lawyer who would come to apply the notion of the juridical thing.
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When the lawyer needs to affix the subject matter in transactions
over intangible assets (such as a formula, a method, or a model) that
is sold, encumbered, or donated, the lawyer can operate just as he or
she does when operating with a legal entity. 54 The lawyer knows
that, in fact, the legal entity does not actually exist, but the lawyer
also knows how to conceive or imagine it as if it did exist and to act
accordingly. 55 The same goes with the juridical thing.
With this common practice in mind, we can then truly speak of
a sale (emptio venditio) or lease (locatio conductio) of technology,
and categorize transactions involving technology with the wellknown nominate contracts. In this way, a host of solutions and possibilities hitherto not applied yet are made available to the civil law
jurist. Without attempting to restrict transactions including intangibles by application of legal formulas and rules for transactions over
tangible assets, we may now also speak of a sale, lease, deposit, loan,
mortgage, servitude, barter, rent, pledge, possession, and prescription
over subject matter such as technology, computer programs (e.g., Adobe,
Microsoft Office, Kaspersky Antivirus, etc.), trade secrets, trademarks
(e.g., Coca-Cola, Mickey Mouse, Google, etc.), works of art and authorship (e.g., Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, Rodgers and Hammerstein’s The
Sound of Music, Picasso’s Guernica, etc.), and businesses’ goodwill
(e.g., AT&T, Hilton, or American Express franchises). We can convert
transactions in the following ways:
- software license agreement into a computer disk sale agreement;56
- joint research agreement into a limited partnership;
- authorship development agreement into a rent of authorship;
54. Although the legal entity is an acting agent and not a subject matter of
transactions like the juridical thing is, the analogy works because what matters
here is not the nature of either an entity or a thing, but the intellectual exercise of
conceiving or imagining such fiction.
55. These mechanics are also useful for distinguishing the intangible from
the material that contains it, or the individual that conceives it. It allows understanding that the material or individual is not the IP subject matter, but the intangible thing alone. Similarly, as with legal entities when someone represents it, the
distinction between the legal entity and the representative is clear, and the latter
is not taken as to be the legal entity itself at any time.
56. See Annex A.
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- confidentiality agreement into a mandate of confidentiality;
- franchise agreement into a goodwill lease agreement.57
These conversions require a code revision to implement them
properly. Therefore, we must bear in mind that awaiting such code revision and a rent remains restricted to realty, a “rent of authorship” is only
a device to work with (and not a nominate contract enforceable as such
by the courts). There is no rent of intangibles yet codified. Further, the
prior list is not exhaustive and a “software loan agreement” may convert
into a “lease” or “deposit”; and a “mandate of confidentiality” may convert into a “promise” or “declaration,” or otherwise be deemed a “natural
obligation.”
B. One Same Formula in the Civil Code for All Kinds of Property
Rights
The notion of juridical thing overcomes the stilted inclusion of
intellectual property as an incorporeal right in the code. If we incorporate the notion of the juridical thing into Louisiana Civil Code
article 448 and add the words “and intellectuals,” the article would
read as follows: “Things are divided into common, public and private; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables, immovables and
intellectuals.” 58 Note that intellectuals are distinguished from incorporeals, although intellectual things are also incorporeal.
Likewise, if one removes the words “right of” from article 461
by replacing it with “things consisting,” it would read as follows:
“Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are comprehended
by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes,
obligations, and things consisting of intellectual property.” 59
Additionally, article 475 reads that, “[a]ll things, corporeal or
incorporeal, that the law does not consider as immovable, are movables.” Thus, because the Code does not establish rights of intellectual property as either movable or immovable, they shall be deemed
57.
58.
59.

See Annex B and C.
Emphasis added.
Emphasis added.
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movable things. If we take the rights of intellectual property as the
subject matter of property, then this classification is admissible.
However, it is not if we take as subject matter—as we should—the
very goods in themselves: the works of intellect. The reason being
that this property is not composed of matter and does not occupy
space; consequently, it is not subject to transportation or allocation
(sculptures, paintings, and works of this genre are “incorporated”
intellectual property that do not raise an exception).
Legal rights may be identified as movable or immovable things
because their legal existence is essentially related to an individual or
a corporeal thing that takes up space and is subject to movement.
Intellectual things as juridical things instead exist by themselves and
do not need this relationship to another entity. It is irrelevant to qualify them as movables and immovables.
The Code could include the amendments above and additional
ones may be suggested. First, however, we use the term “intellectual
property” over the Code’s term “incorporeal property” because objective incorporeals (which are not of an intellectual nature)—to wit,
“legal rights, obligations and actions”—are included in the Civil
Code already in articles 461, 470, and 473. Also, because the legal
implications derived from intellectual incorporeals are clearly different from those derived from objective incorporeals (movable and
immovable incorporeals) as we will discuss in section VIII A.
C. The “Licensed, Not Sold” Exception to the First Sale Doctrine
on Computer Programs is Implied with the Juridical Thing
The juridical thing allows to clearly distinguish a computer program from the medium containing it. In such a case, both properties
coexist in one same tangible asset without confusing the rights that
belong to each. An example of such a condition is reflected in a
computer disk sale agreement provided here as Annex A. The sale
of a disk will not imply the sale of the intellectual property rights of
copying and distribution.
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There is no need to find the “licensed, not sold” exception to the
first sale doctrine. 60 In Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme Court established that copyright owner’s distribution rights were limited to the
first sale of the copyrighted work and copyright owner could not
restrict book owners to re-sell or otherwise dispose of the book. Under this rule, a software transfer could be sold upon transferring the
disk (or a medium that contained it) and the purchaser would be entitled to resell the software or medium at will. To prevent this, software owners implemented the so-called End-User License Agreements (EULA) to avoid the operation of a sale in these cases. Software owners could do this based on the Copyright Act revision of
1976 that provided for software license agreements. 61 Again, the “licensed, not sold” exception to the first sale doctrine is served with
the notion of the juridical thing because it allows from the start
to distinguish medium from software and the rights to each (corporeal and intellectual, respectively).
In this matter, curiously, the civil law in Europe is at odds
with itself. This is because the European Court of Justice ignored the distinction between the juridical thing and the medium
and allowed the first purchaser of a disk to grant a subsequent
purchaser the use of the computer program (a right an owner of
a disk does not have by solely purchasing the disk) via the resale
of the disk. 62
D. Law School Curricula
Typically, intellectual property is taught as a course separate
from property law, but the juridical thing will allow the civilian
60. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109. In this case, the defendant prevailed on his
claim to rightfully put different prices on books priced for resale by plaintiff based
on that the exclusive statutory right to “vend” applied only to the first sale of the
copyrighted work.
61. See Copyright Act, supra note 49, at § 117.
62. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’ l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I0000.
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to understand that intellectual property is not a sui generis law
but one that stems from, and is part of, the regular notions of
property. A separate or special course on intellectual property
will take a close look at property law in that area just as, for
example, a separate course on real estate does.
E. Arbitration, Mediation, and Alternative Dispute Resolution
The fabulous stock of alternative solutions provided by Roman law can be immediately applied in the private practice of
the law. For example, rent of authorship can be agreed upon if
jurisdiction is given to arbitration or mediation. Arbitration and
mediation centers will expand their practice vigorously.
VII. IDEAS AND RIGHTS
A. Unlike Legal Rights, Ideas Need Not to Be Classified as Movables and Immovables
Had we adopted the term incorporeal things in the foregoing sections instead of intellectual things, we would have had to further
distinguish those incorporeal things into objective and subjective
things because ideas or intellectual things cannot be treated as movables and/or immovable things. Instead, rights not only can, but
should be treated as such. Objective incorporeal things would include rights that refer to individuals (by law or contract), but are not
originated with the individual, and subjective incorporeal things
would include ideas that originate with the individual.
Rights include essentially relationships between a person and a
thing, or between two or more persons in reference to a thing (certain or ascertainable). 63 Rights always refer to something and it is
this reference to something that gives the right its value and use.
Other relationships would lack any legal interest if there were no
63. D’ORS, supra note 15, at § 48. See VILLEY, supra note 15, at § 54. AQUIsupra note 15.

NAS,
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property interest involved. For example, a family relationship (siblings, in-laws, cousins, etc.) would not in itself (i.e., by the mere
bond) have legal significance, except when a common ancestor dies,
and a succession is opened.
Ideas are operations or productions of the mind (the etymology
of term idea suggests the notion of an image or representation 64)
that, under the law, are useful and/or original in and of themselves.
Ideas make no reference to anything else to exist and are not in a
relationship other than with its author. The benefit that an idea yields
derives from its own capacity to give an advantage or to allow a
useful application. In this sense, one could say that an idea is more
of a thing (at least legally) than a right or a bond because the idea
does not require a thing different from it to have value or legal significance.
The moment we categorize rights as things, they must be categorized as movables or immovables. Indeed, if a right relates to a
movable, it would not make sense to treat it as an immovable, and
vice versa. There should not be a taxonomic uncertainty regarding
intellectual things. If intellectual property is neither movable nor immovable, this should be affirmed positively; otherwise, intellectual
property will be mistaken for one or the other. Thus, the movable
and immovable classification should not apply to intellectual property, even though this classification has prevailed for every property
throughout history. After all, never have immovable things been
classified as fungible or non-fungible. 65

64. See the following meanings of Idea: WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY,
supra note 45: “Form or appearance of a thing as opposed to its reality.” See also
DICCIONARIO LATINO-ESPAÑOL (Spes 1950): “prototype.” LE PETIT LAROUSSE
(Larousse 1998), at 1 : “Représentation abstraite d’un être . . . d’un objet.”
65. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 27, at 756.
The Louisiana Civil Codes have adopted this distinction only by implication. The word ‘fungibles’ occurs in the French Civil Code and in the
French text of the Louisiana Civil Code in connection with compensation. In several other articles reference is made to fungibles by description rather than by use of this term.
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If the legal character of ideas remained uncertain at this point
or if ideas could simultaneously qualify as movables and immovables, one same idea could be subject to contradicting privileged
rights of creditors. A debtor’s intellectual property would not be enforceable by a creditor because it is a movable idea, but it could turn
out to be enforceable by another creditor if an immovable.
Because the ideas are incorporeal and because they do not
need to connect to something else to have legal significance,
ideas should not be classified into movables and immovables.
Having no physical matter, incorporeal things occupy no space
and are not subject to motion. Rights, however, although they
are also incorporeal, can give up legally the incorporeal status
precisely because their legal value depends on another corporeal
entity.
In time, we may also be able to hold and exercise rights
relating to ideas (i.e., intangible property over intangible property). In this example, we can see a further distinction between
these two types of incorporeal things and their different legal
effects: although rights over rights are generally dismissed by
the law for good reasons, 66 rights with respect to ideas are direct and clear and so they may be allowed under the same rationale that denies rights over rights (i.e., a misleading treatment of rights and exposure to forfeiting property).
B. Ideas Warrant Expiration; Rights Do Not
Rights are not subject to expiration because, in most cases,
they expire with the thing or the alienation of the thing to which
they refer Ideas warrant extinctive prescription (cf. statutory
limitation) or expiration because just as they do not make use
of space, they are not subject to time and are imperishable.
66. C. CIV., art. 516 (Fr.); BGB, art. 90 (Ger.); CÓD. CIV., art 565 (Chile) (the
Code of Bello is an exception to the general rule prohibiting rights over rights, but
it does not include intellectual things or other incorporeals as the goodwill of individuals or business entities, business relationships).
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It is legally unreasonable to grant perpetual existence to intellectual property when this property has to be harmonized
with the public interest on the dissemination of ideas, science,
and culture. It is then necessary to point out limits to the legal
existence of intellectual property. Something similar already
happens with the acquisition of property by acquisitive prescription (cf., adverse possession); and so, the uncertainty of
the title for a property should not prevent a lawful holder of a
property for twenty years or more to become its owner. 67
C. Ideas Do Not Warrant the Distinction Between Pledge and Antichresis (and Mortgages), Whereas Rights Do
The incorporeal nature of things (such that it does not make the
use of time nor space essential to their existence) dismisses the classification of guarantees in either conventional pledge (if the subject
property is moveable) or antichresis (if the subject property is immoveable). For intellectual property, there would be no essential
distinction between pledge and antichresis; the guarantee can be established with either name.
It is not just that intellectual property may be simultaneously
subject to a pledge and/or a mortgage—like when specific legislation may establish an unconventional mortgage over a moveable
thing or an unconventional pledge over an immovable—it is that the
distinction between pledge and mortgage disappears altogether
when it comes to establishing guaranties over ideas. This should not
come as a surprise; something similar already occurs concerning
corporeal property, when it is not necessary to distinguish in the
sale, as in the lease, a residential from an agricultural lease. 68
67. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3486 (2019): “Ownership and other real rights
in immovables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the
need of just title or possession in good faith.”
68. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2671 (2017):
Depending on the agreed use of the leased thing, a lease is characterized
as: residential, when the thing is to be occupied as a dwelling; agricultural, when the thing is a predial estate that is to be used for agricultural
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Privileges may be enforced uniformly over intellectual property,
together with movables and immovables. A legislative drafting will
be able to provide for that in articles 3186–3189 of the Louisiana
Civil Code (on the several kinds of privileges), combining movable,
immovable and intellectual things indistinctly pursuant to the execution of privileged rights over them.
VIII. PROSPECTS OF A LEGAL UPDATE
The present article seemingly appears to be challenged by the
century-long debate 69 resulting in the law denying rights over
purposes; mineral, when the thing is to be used for the production of
minerals; commercial, when the thing is to be used for business or commercial purposes; or consumer, when the thing is a movable intended for
the lessee’ s personal or familial use outside his trade or profession. This
enumeration is not exclusive.
When the thing is leased for more than one of the above or for other
purposes, the dominant or more substantial purpose determines the type
of lease for purposes of regulation.
69. Since 1942, the debate has continued with notable scholars taking sides.
Against admitting intangible things: Henri et Jean Mazeaud (France), André
Rouast (France), Fernando Conesa (Spain), José Massaguer (Spain). Favorable to
admitting intangible things: Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert (France), Louis
Josserand (France), Friedrich Beier (Germany), Oscar Carosone (Italy) (although
by assimilating ideas to an electrochemical component) and José Castán Tobeñas
(Spain). Also, scholars Gert Kummerow and Luis René Viso (Venezuela). See
RICARDO BETHENCOURT, COMPRENSIÓN DE LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL, 37-63
(Jurídica Venezolana 2005). The doctoral thesis of Juliana Gáfaro Barrera and
Fanny Lucía Gómez Pryor (Colombia) includes a comprehensive survey of Latin
America practitioners (although now in need of update) who are also favorable to
admitting intangible things. See JULIANA GÁFARO BARRERA & FANNY LUCÍA GÓMEZ PRYOR, PATENTE DE INVENCIÓN: UN DERECHO REAL DE PROPIEDAD (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana 1977). Although the law continues to reject a full inclusion and/or development of intangible things, the debate narrowed down
throughout the years toward favoring their admission. Pedro Chaloupka (Argentina) stated already in 1983 that:
[t]here is an increasing trend in the world—for the time being reduced
almost exclusively to scholars with still few legislative achievements—
of encompassing the legal treatment of both categories [works of authorship and patents & trademarks] in a unified universe . . . . To that end,
the World Intellectual Property Organization . . . has carried out and proposed Uniform Laws.
PEDRO CHALOUPKA, 3 LA PROPIEDAD DE LAS IDEAS (Revista Derechos Intelectuales, Astrea 1988). Pursuant thereto, the Intellectual Property Act of El Salvador, already in 1996, moved forward and united these rights. The Puerto Rico
Civil Code of 2013 has admitted intangible things broadly, although it does not
specify which they are (see infra, note 76). The Louisiana Civil Code has admitted
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intangible property. 70 This is not the case. This important conclusion
of the debate was directed to prevent the dilution of the direct object
of a right by artificially introducing a right over the direct right in
the thing like a “rent of a title” or a “lien in a mortgage.” However,
this was at a time when intangible goods were limited to rights, actions and legal interests, and did not include ideas; ideas are now the
direct object of property.
However, under the same heading of intangible things, this
article is an invitation to further debate, hopefully brief and this
time aimed particularly at including new intangible things,
which remain the direct object of property. The following factors should be considered in such a debate:
1. That intangible things will now also include ideas and abstractions (of the individuals’ skills and qualities), in addition to the subjective rights;
2. That admitting ideas and abstractions will not implicate
the risk of disguising the identity of the thing subject to
property or a transaction (as with rights over rights in
things);
3. That the human factor plays today a preponderant role in
the production of wealth as much as land and capital; 71
4. That the balance between the public and private interest
has moved to a safe point of coexistence similar to the
intangible things since its adoption in 1870 (art. 460 (1)) but converts them into
corporeal for legal purposes (see infra, notes 76, 76); see also Yiannopoulos, supra note 27, at 772. The Bello Code for Chile was the exception in the civil codedrafting era of the 1800s and since 1857, it admitted incorporeal things, although
limited to the kind of incorporeal things existing at the time (i.e., subjective
rights). A definite conclusion of the efforts to fully develop intangible property is
what this article achieves through the juridical thing.
70. See infra, note 73.
71. Darrell M. West, Technology and the Innovation Economy, BROOKINGS,
Oct. 19, 2011, https://perma.cc/2DE3-GK3A; Carroll, supra note 28; ST. JOHN
PAUL II, supra note 28, at 31-32. See also presentations at the Offshore Europe
Conference at Aberdeen, U.K. (Society of Petroleum Engineers 1995) by (i) Richard L. Green, Partnering and Alliances: Theory and Practice; (ii) M. Straughen,
Re-Engineering the alliances and Partnerships; and (iii) Susan Farrell & J. Ray
McDermott, An international Perspective on Risk/Reward Contracting: Comparison of U.S. Middle East and U.K. Alliances.
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comparable coexistence in tangible things (e.g., the balance existing between private property and eminent domain);
5. That intangible things are already admitted in practical life
and implied in legal transactions;
6. That there is a gap between the law and practice; and
7. That the availability of clear and strong legal solutions
will spur individual wealth and private enterprise.
The development of civil law may be accomplished by the
sole implementation of the juridical thing. While awaiting legislative change, attorneys and professionals trained in the civil
law may come to instantly avail themselves with a host of new
solutions already available in their code, empowering their practice of intellectual property and unfair competition. Nothing is
more practical than a good theory, as John Delaney points out. 72
Further, the legal professional will be enabled to assist and
put into practice for authors, designers, or inventors who are residents of Louisiana (or Louisiana transactions) the rights recognized by the federal laws in connection with the civil law on
property, contracts, and torts. Unlike other codes, 73 the current

72. JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING (J. Delaney Publ’g
1989).
73. Compare the relevant provisions of the Civil Codes of France (1804),
and Germany (1900), which have modeled the civil codes worldwide: C. CIV., art.
516 (Fr.): “All property is movable or immovable.” The code included intellectual
property in 2015, but intellectual property continues to be treated as a legal right,
and not as property. Prior to that, France had adopted, in 1992, the Code de la
Propriété Intellectuelle but again, intellectual property was treated as a legal right,
and not as a separate kind of thing.
BGB, art. 90 (Ger.): “Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law.”
For codes worldwide denying or restricting the inclusion of intangible things, see:
CODE CIVIL [CC] [Civil Code] (Switz.) which classifies intellectual property as
legal rights but not as a separate kind of incorporeal things. For provisions on
traditional knowledge, see arts. 196(a) & 210(1bis); on competition, see arts.
240(c), 340, 340(b) & 418(d); on inventions and designs, see art. 332; on copyrights, see arts. 380-393; and on trade secrets, see arts. 321(a)(4), 340, 418(d),
697(2)(3), 803(1), 857(2).
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] [Civil Code] (It.), art. 810. Although incorporeal things may
be implicit in art. 810: “Things that may become the object of rights are property”
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Louisiana Civil Code explicitly includes incorporeal property, 74 but only to treat them further as corporeal movables 75
and immovables. 76 The law then is called to develop its
(Sono beni le cose che possono formare oggetto di diritti), the classification the
Code later makes of things omits incorporeals entirely.
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Code] (Spain), art. 333: “All things which are or may
be subject to appropriation are considered movable or immovable property.”
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [Civil Code] (Arg.), arts. 2311-12; See GUILLERMO
CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LOS CONOCIMIENTOS TÉCNICOS 274-5 (Heliasta 1984):
The domain protected by the Civil Code and other relevant provisions
apply to things or to material objects likely to have a value . . . . And so
it is the case that the different rules related to the acquisition of ownership lack generally any meaning if there’ s an attempt to apply them to
intangible things.
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Code] (Braz.), Book II, arts. 79 et seq., do not include
the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things; the latter are regulated
by statutes other than the civil code and then as rights and not as property.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, (Can.), art. 899: “Property, whether corporeal
or incorporeal, is divided into immovables and movables.”
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] (Jap.), art. 85: “The term ‘Things’ as used in this Code
shall mean tangible thing.”
74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 448 (2019): “Things are divided into common,
public and private; corporeals, incorporeals; and movables and immovables.”
75. Id. at art. 473.
76. Id. at art. 470. See also art. 461 § 2: “Incorporeals are things that have no
body, but are comprehended by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes, obligations, and right of intellectual property.” But because art.
475 reads that “[a]ll things, corporeal or incorporeal, that the law does not consider as immovable, are movables,” then all incorporeal things are legally treated
as corporeal things.
For codes admitting incorporeal things, see:
The Civil Code of Chile operates similarly to the Louisiana Code. It explicitly
includes incorporeal property but only to limit it to legal rights. CÓD. CIV., art.
565: “Goods consist of corporeal or incorporeal things. Corporeal things are those
having a true entity and may be perceived by the senses, like a house, a book.
Incorporeal things consist of mere rights, such as rights of credit and active easements.” Art. 584: “The works of talent or wit belong to their authors. This kind of
property is governed by separate statutes.”
In Puerto Rico, the Civil Code is broader than either the Louisiana or Chile Codes
because it includes incorporeal without limiting them to rights, although without
specifying the goods falling into its category. It is an open provision, unique to
this code and suited to include the juridical thing. CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code], art.
252 reads: “The term ‘property’ is generally applicable to anything that may constitute wealth or fortune.” This term also relates simultaneously with the term
“things” which constitutes the second object of the law, according to which the
principles and rules thereof refer to people, things and actions. Further, art. 258
reads:
Things are also divided into corporeal and incorporeal. Those that are
tangible are manifest to the senses, can be touched or tasted and have a
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solutions over incorporeals to have a standing of their own
and, further, to expand its scope (presently limited to rights,
obligations, and actions) in order that it includes intellectual
things and objective incorporeal things as well.
Incorporeals do not have a separate standing or section in
the code. The development of such a provision, with all its
implications, is yet to be done. Indeed, decades ago, Prof.
Gert Kummerow pointed out that incorporeal property is one
of “unsuspected legal applications.” 77 And Professors Planiol
and Ripert stated that “incorporeal properties are intended to
achieve great development . . . .” 78
ANNEX A
(Illustrating Section VI.C)
COMPUTER DISK SALE AGREEMENT
(for a Software License Agreement)
When the owner licenses a computer program—as an intellectual
thing—he is really not licensing the computer program but quite the
opposite: the owner is denying intellectual property rights in it. The
owner is only selling the disk, the tangible thing.
In this context, the Computer Disk Sales can secure the intellectual
property rights of the owner by providing a warning. Certainly, the
prolific restrictions of the standard Software License Agreements
can be included here.

body, whether animate or inanimate. Of this kind of things are the fruits,
cereals, gold, silver, clothing, furniture, land, pastures, woods, house, etcetera. Incorporeal things are those that are not manifest to the senses
and whose existence is only conceived by the understanding, such as inheritance rights, easements and obligations.
77. KUMMEROW, supra note 26, at 39.
78. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 3 TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 489-510 (L.G.D.J. 1952).
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CAVEAT
The purchase of this disk does not convey intellectual property rights in its
contents. The purchase is limited to the disk (incorporating the program)
and the use and benefit obtained therefrom.
Consequently, you are not authorized to reproduce or distribute in any
way the computer software contained in this disk, except the right to make
a backup or support copy of the software for your personal use and safety
procedures.
The violation of these provisions may result in the seizure of the disk and
all other materials containing the illegal reproductions of the software,
notwithstanding the prosecution of civil and criminal penalties under the
law.
Compare to a Software Lease Agreement:
LEASE. OWNER hereby leases the computer programs identified
above (“Software”) to LESSEE [anywhere] [the territory of . . . . ]
[Industry or markets . . . .] for a royalty fee and under the terms
contained hereunder. This is a lease of an intellectual property and
as such it comprises the reproduction or copying of the Software.
Updates and upgrades of Software shall be construed as leased hereunder and by the more specific terms provided for them in this
agreement. The use of Software other than the use granted under this
agreement shall require OWNER’s consent.
ANNEX B
(Illustrating Section VI.A)
LEASE OF COMPANY’S GOODWILL (or Franchise Agreement)
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COMPANY (referred to as Lessor) by this agreement leases to
[name of lessee] (referred to as Lessee), the following described
goodwill of COMPANY (“Goodwill”):
1. GOODWILL. COMPANY leases its Goodwill to Lessee for the
location, time, terms and conditions as provided hereunder. COMPANY’S Goodwill shall consist of its Market Value and/or Selling
Capacity [Optional: specify the Market Value and/or Selling Capacity]. 79
2. Royalties/Fees/Rent. This lease is made for and in consideration
of a royalty fee or rent of $ [dollar amount], payable [specification
of frequency and terms of payment].
3. Ownership of Company’s System; Standards.
4. Lines of Supply; Customers; Confidentiality; Noncompetition.
5. Use of patents, trademarks, copyrights.
6. Advertising.
7. Training; On-Line Systems Support Guide.
8. Lease of Equipment and Facilities.
9. Merchandising and Inventory; Recommended Vendors
10. Term and Renewal. This lease is for the term of [specification of
term] commencing on [date] and ending on [date].
11. Bookkeeping and Financial Matters. Audit Rights.
12. Taxes.
13. No Assignment or Subleases.
14. Representations and Covenants.
15. Indemnity. Insurance.
16. Termination.
17. Mediation. Governing Law. Jurisdiction.
18. Miscellaneous Provisions.
19. Surety.

79. Goodwill, Market Value, Selling Capacity, etc. are terms that describe the
Objective Incorporeal thing in franchise agreements; i.e., the one true property
being leased.
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[Name of surety], who is a party to this contract of lease and is bound
with Lessee IN SOLIDO for the faithful execution of all the obligations to be performed on the part of the Lessee, and furthermore
waives all rights to a release from this obligation due to Lessor’s
failure to protest for nonpayment of rent or due to granting of any
extensions or indulgences to Lessee or any modifications of this
lease, or due to the filing of a bankruptcy, receivership or respite
petition by or against Lessee or discharge in bankruptcy of Lessee,
or on Lessee’s suspension, failure or insolvency, or to the appointment of a receiver for Lessee by any competent court.
This lease is made and signed in triplicate, in [name of city], Louisiana, on [date of lease].
_____________ [Name of lessee]
_____________ [Name of lessor]
_____________ [Name of surety]
When the notion of such an incorporeal is not in place, compare the
otherwise lengthy descriptions practitioners make to get the point
across (if they do).
Statement of Intent 80
(1) Franchising is a method of distributing goods or services in
a consistent manner. The customer expects a similar shopping experience at a franchised business, regardless of its location or operator.
By signing this Agreement, you acknowledge the importance of
these concepts, and agree to participate in the 7-Eleven System,
which promotes a uniform method of operating a convenience store.
You recognize that a uniform presentation of a high quality 7-Eleven
Image is critical to the customer’s perception of the 7-Eleven
80
SEC filings, i.e. 7-Eleven, Inc., Individual Store Franchise Agreement, Exhibit
10.(ii)(B)(1), at https://perma.cc/R8BQ-JGB5.
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System, and that you agree to contribute to that perception by operating your Store in compliance with this Agreement and the 7Eleven System.
(2) You recognize the benefits to you and the 7-Eleven System
(including the benefits of scale that a large chain gets from its high
volume of purchases) of purchasing the products and services sold
at your Store from common vendors and/or distributors. You agree:
(a) to operate your Store in a way that recognizes the right and responsibility of the retailer to provide value to 7-Eleven customers
and (b) to order the products and services 7-Eleven customers want,
introduce new products, manage frequent deliveries, discontinue offering slow selling items, and provide excellent customer service.
(3) You agree that the 7-Eleven System is subject to modification based on changes in technology, competitive circumstances,
customer expectations, and other market variables. Those changes
to the 7-Eleven System may include changes in operating standards,
products, programs, services, methods, forms, policies and procedures; changes in the design and appearance of the building, signage
and equipment; and changes to the Service Mark and Related Trademarks.
(4) We agree to assist you by providing a recognized brand, merchandising advice and operational systems designed to meet the
needs of 7-Eleven customers. We also agree to contribute to the
value of the 7-Eleven Service Mark and brand by fulfilling those
duties and tasks assigned to us in this Agreement as our responsibility within the 7-Eleven System.
(5) You recognize the advantages of the 7-Eleven System and
wish to obtain a franchise for a 7-Eleven Store. You understand that
an investment in the Store involves business risks and that your business abilities and efforts are vital to the success of the Store. You
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agree that the terms of this Agreement are acceptable to you and are
material and reasonable.
ANNEX C
(Illustrating Section VI.A)
The following sample is an actual franchise which already makes
the point of identifying the objective incorporeal thing—a concept
and system (see first sentence)—without referring to the term
“goodwill” (it doesn’t have to):
LEASE OF COMPANY’S GOODWILL (or Franchise Agreement)
1. The Franchise. 81 We have the exclusive right to license and
franchise a concept and system (the “Hotel System”) associated with
the establishment and operation of hotels under the name “HYATT® PLACE” and other Proprietary Marks (defined below) (collectively, “Hyatt Place Hotels”). Before signing this Agreement, you
read our Uniform Franchise Offering Circular and independently investigated and evaluated the risks of investing in the hotel industry
generally and acquiring a Hyatt Place Hotel franchise specifically.
Following your investigation and recognizing the benefits that you
may derive from being identified with the Hotel System, you wish
to enter into this Agreement to obtain a franchise to use the Hotel
System to operate a Hyatt Place Hotel located at HOTELADDRESS1, HOTELADDRESS2 (the “Hotel”).
A. The Hotel. The Hotel includes all structures, facilities, appurtenances, furniture, fixtures, equipment, entrances, exits, and parking areas located on the real property identified on Attachment A or
any other real property we approve for Hotel expansion, signage, or
81. SEC filings, i.e. Form of Franchise Agreement, Franchise Agreement between Hyatt Place Franchising, LLC and Entity Name Caps, Exhibit 10.46, at
https://perma.cc/5CAS-65V5.
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other facilities. You may not make any material changes to the Hotel’s existing or planned construction without our prior written consent, including any change in the number of guest rooms at the Hotel
(collectively “Guest Rooms”).
B. The Hotel System. We and our affiliates have designed the
Hotel System so that the public associates Hyatt Place Hotels with
high quality standards. The Hotel System now includes: (a) the trade
names, trademarks, and service marks “Hyatt Place” and such other
trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, slogans, trade dress,
domain names, and other designations of source and origin (including all derivatives of the foregoing) that we periodically develop and
designate for use in connection with the Hotel System (collectively,
the “Proprietary Marks”); (b) all copyrightable materials that we periodically develop and designate for use in connection with the Hotel
System, including the Manual (as defined below), videotapes,
CDs/DVDs, marketing materials (including advertising, promotional, and public relations materials), architectural drawings (including all architectural plans, designs, and layouts such as, without
limitation, site, floor, plumbing, lobby, electrical, and landscape
plans), building designs, and business and marketing plans, whether
or not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office (“Copyrighted Materials”); (c) all materials and other information that we designate as
“confidential” orally or in writing or which, under the circumstances
surrounding disclosure, ought to be treated as confidential, including all operations information, confidential manuals, revenue information, specifications, procedures, and business, marketing and
other plans, as more fully identified in Section 5F of this Agreement
(collectively, “Confidential Information”); (d) a national toll-free
number for, and other aspects of, the central reservation system, as
we renovate and modify it from time to time (“CRS”); (e) a global
distribution system, as we renovate and modify it from time to time
(“GDS”); (f) the national directory of Hyatt Place Hotels (which, at
our option, also may be associated with any other hotel brand or
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other business that we or our affiliates own, operate, franchise, license or manage) (the “National Directory”); (g) management, personnel, and operational training programs, materials, and procedures; (h) standards, specifications, procedures, and rules for operations, marketing, construction, equipment, furnishings, and quality
assurance (collectively, “System Standards”) described in our confidential manuals, as amended from time to time (collectively, the
“Manual”), or in other written or electronic communications; and (i)
marketing, advertising, and promotional programs. Although we retain the right to establish and periodically to modify System Standards for the Hotel that you agree to implement and maintain, and. to
modify the Hotel System as we deem best for Hyatt Place Hotels,
you retain the right to control, and responsibility for, the Hotel’s
day-to-day management and operation and implementing and maintaining System Standards at the Hotel. In addition, our mandatory
System Standards do not include any personnel or security-related
policies or procedures that we (at our option) make available to you
in the Manual or otherwise for your optional use. You will determine
to what extent, if any, these optional policies and procedures should
apply to your Hotel’s operations. You acknowledge that we do not
dictate or control labor or employment matters for franchisees and
their employees and will not be responsible for the safety and security of Hotel employees or patrons.

